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Empirical attempts to link teenage out-of-wedlock births to the incentive structure of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) have met with mixed results.  This has suggested to many
researchers that, while the AFDC program contains incentives for poor women to have children out-of-
wedlock, these incentives cannot be the primary culprit responsible for current levels of out-of-wedlock
births.  This paper presents a model that is consistent with the stylized facts and the empirical evidence but
establishes a mechanism through which AFDC could in fact be the primary reason for observed levels of
illegitimacy.  The model is standard with one exception: How much utility individuals are able to obtain from
having a child depends on the level of “social approval” that is associated with having out-of-wedlock
children.  This social approval is a function of the fraction of individuals in all previous generations who
chose to have children out-of-wedlock, where the effect of each generation diminishes with time.  While
the model is successful in replicating the stylized facts on AFDC and illegitimacy and establishes a link
between the two through a government induced change in “values,” it also demonstrates that welfare reform
aimed at reducing the incentives for poor women to have out-of-wedlock births may not be as effective
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Concern over the rise in out-of-wedlock births, especially among teenagers, and sharp
increases in the number of single headed households is widespread and growing. In the three
decades following 1960, illegitimate births as a percentage of total live births rose from below 5% to
over 30%, and the fraction of households headed by females rose similarly from 7% to well over
20%. 1 Today, close to one third of all births nationwide, approximately two thirds of black births
and as many as 80% of births in some central cities are to single mothers. At the same time, more
than half of all poor families are made up of female headed households, and children are more likely
to live in poverty than members of any other age group. Given the strong link between socio-
economic background during childhood and a variety of indicators of future success, these trends are
understandably disturbing to policymakers who are increasingly searching for new initiatives to
encourage family formation.
One set of such proposed initiatives involves either eliminating long-standing social programs
which assist single mothers or altering their incentive structures dramatically. Such proposals arise
from the argument that US social policy may be a significant contributing factor to increased
illegitimacy and decreased family formation, a notion that is widely discussed in the literature and
broadly supported by rational choice theory. Becker (1991), for example, suggests that a program
like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) "raises the fertility of eligible women,
including single women, and also encourages divorce and discourages marriage;" and Murray
(1984), in an influential book, argues forcefully that such programs lie at the heart of social
disintegration among the poor. AFDC is particularly targeted for criticism because, in most cases,
eligibility requires both the presence of a dependent child and the incapacitation or absence of one
parent. Thus, single poor women may choose out-of-wedlock births as a way to qualify for
government aid, a possibility that may result, as one recent paper put it, in out-of-wedlock children
becoming "income producing assets" (Clarke and Strauss (1995)).2
However, there are at least three factors that raise doubt about this link between illegitimacy
and AFDC suggested by rational choice theory. First, while illegitimacy and increased family
1See, for example, Robins (1986) and Murray (1993).
2It is interesting to note that AFDC was created with the stated aim of aiding young widows with children. Today, only 2%
of all AFDC beneficiaries fall into this category, and most beneficiaries are mothers of out-of-wedlock children.
2dissolution are indeed more prominent among those eligible for public assistance, these phenomena
are by no means restricted to those populations. Second, despite declines in real AFDC benefit levels
over the past two decades, illegitimacy has consistently been on the rise, both among the poor and,
to a lesser extent, the population at large.3 These two stylized facts are at odds with a pure rational
choice model's predictions and suggest that the rational choice theorist's emphasis on the financial
incentives embedded in social programs is misplaced and that a more complex mechanism may be at
work. Finally, the empirical literature linking AFDC to out-of-wedlock births tends to confirm this
skepticism in that its results have been largely inconclusive.4 Even those studies that have
demonstrated a positive link (Clarke and Strauss (1995), for example), have typically relied heavily
on state and especially time fixed effects whose impact on out-of-wedlock births substantially
outweighs any impact demonstrated for AFDC. (Studies that do not find positive links find similar
fixed effects to be important.) The rational choice framework thus fails to predict important stylized
trends while receiving only modest empirical support.
We attempt here to use insights from the sociology and psychology literatures to improve the
predictive power of this rational choice model. In particular, we introduce into utility functions a new
argument called "social approval" (or "stigma" or "values")5 that is exogenous for individuals but
is determined endogenously as a function of all individual behavior in past generations.6 Thus, the
See, for example, Hoynes (1996) for a discussion of these trends, and Moffitt, Ribar and Wilhelm (1996) for an
intriguing political economy explanation of the decline in benefits.
Moffitt (1992), Murray (1993) and Acs (1994) examine differences between studies and find that there is only mixed
evidence of a significant effect of welfare on illegitimacy. While Jackson and Klerman (1995) and Clarke and Strauss
(1995) have demonstrated a positive link, Hoynes (1995), Duncan and Hoffman (1990), Lundberg and Plotnick (1990)
and Ellwood and Bane (1985) have found either mixed results or failed to establish a significant relationship. In a
somewhat different type of study, Grogger and Bronars (1996) find little empirical evidence that AFDC affects subsequent
fertility choices by already unwed mothers, but they do find support for an AFDC effect on marriage decisions.
Anecdotal evidence certainly suggests that stigma can play a major role in out-of-wedlock fertility choices. A recent
New York Times article, for example, suggests that "having a baby without being married is still a humiliation" in
Japan where, "even among teenagers who get pregnant, many do not talk about it, [and] have never heard of other similar
situations." Only 1.1% of births in Japan were to unwed mothers in 1994, while close to one third of children in the US
are born into single parent households (WuDunn (1996)). The intensity of stigma in Japan doubtlessly plays at least
some role. At the same time, the empirical investigations of stigma and peer effects are plagued by estimation difficulties
and have thus yielded no firm consensus concerning their importance. See, for example, Jencks and Mayer (1990) for a
discussion of the findings in this literature.
6In some sense, we follow Mueller (1986) who, dissatisfied with poor predictions from the rational egoist model
economists are accustomed to, encourages researchers to take seriously a notion he labels "adaptive egoism" in which the
crucial extra ingredient is conditioned behavior resulting from social learning as expressed in rules of thumb (norms).
While individuals might not literally perform elaborate optimizing calculations, they learn these rules of thumb which
then lead them to act as ftheywere optimizing. Evolutionary pressures, it is argued. will ensure the survival of those
values and norms that lead to individual behavior which promotes the well-being of the community as a whole. Similar
evolutionary arguments appear elsewhere (see, for example, Hayek (1973, 1976, 1979) and Axeirod (1981)). In the case
of illegitimacy, for example, stigma against having children out-of-wedlock can be interpreted as a sanction against a
3frequency of out-of-wedlock births in the past determines the level of social approval enjoyed by
those choosing to become single mothers today (where actions of older generations are discounted
more heavily than those of recent generations). With exogenous shocks such as the introduction of
AFDC, changes in individual behavior today therefore influence the level of social approval
tomorrow, which in turn may further change individual behavior and in turn further influence the
level of social approval in the more distant future. We then model the impact public policy has on the
evolution of "values" as represented by the level of social approval for out-of-wedlock births as well
as the consequent implications for the share of children born outside of marriage.7
The model we develop gives predictions consistent with both of the stylized facts we have
mentioned above while also illuminating the empirical literature on the link between AFDC and
illegitimacy. In particular, it is demonstrated that, in the presence of a role for social approval or
stigma, rising illegitimacy accompanied by declining real AFDC benefits is eminently plausible, as is
a "spillover" of illegitimacy from the AFDC population into the population at large. Furthermore, the
model predicts that, especially in the long run, financial incentives embedded in AFDC can become
quite secondary once values (social approval) have changed to the point where out-of-wedlock births
become sufficiently desirable. Therefore, time effects (as well as state effects if populations between
states are sufficiently heterogeneous and spatially separated) can dominate even if financial factors
are initially the only consideration motivating women to choose out-of-wedlock births.
While this model is certainly not the only possible explanation for these stylized trends and the
empirical literature's mixed findings, it provides the only explanation to date that builds on the
economists' rational choice framework and links illegitimacy to social policy in a way that is
consistent with empirical facts.8 As such, it provides a self-contained model which can be used to
practice that would lead to children being brought up in inadequate circumstances which, in turn, would lead to a
weakening of the group.
Since much of the public policy discussion in regard to illegitimacy and AFDC focuses on teenage behavior, we think
this type of social approval parameter is of particular relevance as we generally think of teenagers and young adults as
most easily influenced by peer pressures from their slightly older peers.
8The main competing hypothesis in the economics literature is that there has been a significant decline in the supply of
eligible males which has caused the number of "shot-gun" marriages to decline. Two competing theories regarding this
decline in the supply of men have been offered: (i) the job shortage theory offered by Wilson (1987) which suggests that
this declining supply is due to declining job prospects for young men in poor communities, and (ii) the technology
shock theory by Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) which suggests that the increased availability of abortion and
contraceptive technologies caused a decline in the supply of men who are willing to marry. While we do not argue here
against these competing explanations, we do suggest that they, too, require an underlying model of social stigma in order
to become plausible alternatives. Empirical support for the job shortage theory, for example, is relatively weak (see
Akerlof et. a!. (1996) for a discussion), and the decline in shot-gun marriages predicted by the technology shock
4analyze those current policy proposals that take a definitive link between AFDC and illegitimacy as
given. Such policy analysis in this paper suggests that, even if AFDC is solely responsible for the
trends observed over the past three decades, its reform or elimination may not yield the desired
outcome of reducing illegitimacy substantially or even slightly from current levels. More precisely,
we demonstrate plausible cases under which a sudden elimination of AFDC is accompanied by a
continuing increase in illegitimacy to a much higher level, as well as cases in which such a policy
shift is followed by only a modest decline of illegitimacy to levels far above those experienced before
the program was inaugurated.9
We begin our discussion in Section 1 with a brief review of the economic literature on norms
and values, and a discussion of the intellectual origins of our approach in both the economics and the
sociology literatures. Section 2 then proceeds to lay out the model of illegitimacy used in the rest of
the paper. Section 3 undertakes some comparative statics simulations, while Section 4 investigates
the transition caused by the introduction of AFDC as well as various reform proposals. Section 5
briefly considers the introduction of an explicit marriage decision into the model; Section 6 discusses
the addition of a spatial dimension which may give rise to "pockets" of illegitimacy in relatively
poorer areas, and Section 7 concludes.
1. The Literature on Values, Norms and Conformity
Strong patterns of conformity in human behavior as well as the influential role of norms and
values have given rise to a large number of papers by economists. Models that explain such uniform
behavior and standards are summarized in Figure 1. In general, they can be divided into two large
categories: (i) those that confine themselves to using standard neoclassical preferences
("independent" preferences) and (ii) those that define preferences more broadly to include non-
standard outside social influences directly into utility functions ("interdependent" preferences). In the
former category, some have explained conformity as resulting from incomplete information games in
which less informed agents imitate those deemed more informed, while others have formulated
hypothesis did not occur until years after the technology shock and took decades to run its course. Thus, these
explanations become plausible only if, as Akerlof et. a!. suggest, "the stigma associated with out-of-wedlock
motherhood has declined endogenously."
This is not to suggest that reforming or eliminating AFDC will not reduce the level of illegitimacy from what it would
havebeen hadthe reforms not taken place. Rather, even an elimination of AFDCisconsistent with rising illegitimacy.
even though the increase may be slower and stop earlier as a result of the policy shift.
5sophisticated game theoretic approaches to explain the evolution of coordination (common standards)
and cooperation in the presence of positive externalities that make such cooperative outcomes socially
desirable. However, while these models have yielded a tremendous amount of insight, existing
sociological (Jones (1984)) and psychological (Ross, Bierbrauer and Hoffman (1976)) evidence
suggests that they, by themselves, have limited explanatory power in many circumstances. Both
because of this evidence and because we find the approach particularly appealing for the policy
problem at hand, we will focus here on the last strand of the literature illustrated in Figure 1.
In this literature on "interdependent" preferences, economists have tended to think of "status"
or "reputation" as an explicit additional argument in individual utility functions. More specifically,
economic models have assumed that agents wish, all else being equal, to have the reputation of
abiding by or believing in some pre-existing norm, but aside from adverse reputational effects, at
least some agents would prefer to deviate from that norm. Agents consider this tradeoff and, so long
as the cost from deviating does not outweigh the benefit from the good reputation, will choose to
conform with the norm. Thus, economists have tended to model uniform behavior under these
interdependent preferences as arising from a desire of individuals to gain the reputation of
conforming with some norm. Under certain circumstances, equilibria thus arise under which most or
all agents choose to behave similarly (in accordance with the norm) even though underlying
preferences may differ widely.10
While economists have therefore explained the evolution and persistence of conformity through
a series of carefully constructed models (as illustrated in Figure 1), mathematical sociologists (see,
More precisely, Akerlof (1980) assumes that some agents believe in the norm while others do not and that, whenever the
number of believers is greater than the number of nonbelievers in a particular generation, the number of believers rises in
the next generation (and vice versa). Nonbelievers may act like believers due to reputation effects. Two equilibria
typically emerge for any given norm: one in which no one follows or believes in the norm, and another in which almost
everyone does both. Persistence of the norm in the latter equilibrium is made possible by social sanctions that are
sufficiently strong to keep nonbelievers from unraveling the equilibrium. Bernheim (1994) builds on Akerlof's work in
that he goes beyond demonstrating the feasibility of persistent norms to explain which norms are most likely to persist.
Individual types who again care about reputation (or status) are characterized by heterogeneous preferences over a
continuum of alternatives. They signal their unobservable preference type through their choice of an observable form of
behavior, and it is shown that a single norms can emerge endogenously as a pooling equilibrium even when underlying
preferences are quite diverse. In such an equilibrium, if the weight attached to reputation is sufficiently high, most agents
choose precisely the same action while a fringe chooses dramatically deviant behavior. The development of a norm
occurs because even small deviations are interpreted by others as evidence of extreme underlying preferences which
causes a substantial loss in reputation. Thus, agents either conform completely if their true preferences lie sufficiently
close to the norm, or they choose their ideal point and endure the loss of reputation if their preferences are sufficiently
extreme. Since there is a multiplicity of pooling equilibria, there also exists a role for a social coordinator or government
in selecting a focal value. (Jones (1984) differs somewhat from these approaches in that he assumes utility depends on
the degreetowhich an agent deviates from actions chosen by others.)
6for example, Granovetter (1978), Granovetter and Soong (1983)) have been less precise regarding
the channels through which social influences produce conformity in behavior. Instead, they simply
observe that many binary decisions (such as whether or not to join a riot, or whether or not to have
an out-of-wedlock birth) have the following characteristics (Granovetter and Soon (1983)):
"(i) at any time t, one's choice between the two available decisions depends, in part, on the choices of some
relevant group of others in the preceding time period t-1;
(ii) each unit (person) is distinct, and will react differently from any other to the immediately previous
distribution of choices; [and]
(iii) because each decision depends on the set of decisions in the previous time period, there is an evolution of
the "state vector" over time,"1 1
Thus, for each individual a particular activity becomes desirable once the number of agents engaging
in the activity in the previous period reaches some threshold, but the underlying process by which
these individual threshold levels are determined is left largely unspecified. It may, for example, be
the case that some individuals are more adventurous than others and thus are easily motivated to
participate in riots, while others are more conservative and afraid of "being caught." As the number
of individuals participating in a riot rises, the likelihood of "being caught" declines which causes
more individuals to pass their "threshold" (Granovetter and Soong (1983)). In this case,
coordinating a large number of individuals to participate can result in "efficiency" gains by reducing
the risk of being caught (the second column in Figure 1). It could equally well be the case, however,
that individual "threshold" levels are determined because the number of others participating in the riot
enters directly into individual utility functions (the last column in Figure 1) (Schelling (1978)) or
because less well informed individuals follow the lead of more informed leaders (the first column in
Figure 1). In principle, any of the explicit channels for uniform behavior laid out in Figure 1 could
therefore be used to construct the foundations of a threshold model.12
In this paper, we build on the "interdependent utility" models in Figure 1 (commonly used by
economists) to create a microeconomic foundation to a threshold model (usually used by
sociologists) in order to analyze the effect of social policy on out-of-wedlock births in the presence
of stigma or social (dis)approval of such behavior. We begin by incorporating a social approval
parameter S (which indicates the level of social approval or disapproval for giving birth out-of-
11 This view of interdependent preferences is consistent with some of the empirical sociology literature (Bengston and
Black (1973), Bengston (1975), Glass, Bengston and Dunham (1986)) which identifies generational links that lead to
value similarity between generations. Jones (1984) also models this process in an investigation of worker effort.
12 Similar threshold models have been used frequently in the biological sciences to study epidemics (Bailey (1975)) in
which different individuals have different "thresholds" of natural resistance.
7wedlock) into individual utility functions; this is consistent with the spirit of the economic reputation
models in Figure 1. We then proceed by making S a function of how many agents have chosen to
give birth out-of-wedlock in past generations. While the way in which S enters utility functions is
exogenous to the model,13 the actual level of S is therefore determined endogenously.
Furthermore, since individuals vary both in their preferences as well as their incomes, each
individual's utility maximization problem yields a different "threshold" level of social approval which
will make having an out-of-wedlock birth an optimal choice for her. Thus, by endogenizing the
actual level of social (dis)approval that enters individual utility functions and by modelling explicitly
the underlying individual optimization problems, we provide a microeconomic foundation to the
threshold model of human behavior familiar to sociologists. Agents are then viewed as rational utility
maximizers who face an additional constraint of societal pressures ("culture") not usually modelled
by economists. With the interaction of this individual optimization behavior and societal pressures
explicitly modelled, we can then undertake a careful analysis of both the short run changes in
individual behavior brought about by social policy as well as the long run impact these changes have
on societal outcomes.14
The empirical sociological and psychological evidence on social values and stigma (Ainlay,
Becker and Coleman (1986), Glass, Bengston and Dunham (1986), Jones (1994)) offers a great deal
of support for the underlying assumptions of this approach. In particular, this evidence strongly
suggests that stigma and values are (i) learned by observation of behavior in previous generations as
well as (ii) transmitted via prevailing attitudes toward that behavior in those prior generations.15
The way in which adults view out-of-wedlock births, for instance, is determined by the number of
out-of-wedlock births they witnessed during their formative years as well as the attitudes toward
such behavior expressed by their parents (which, in turn, is determined in large part by behavior
13Ofcourse we envision an underlying evoltionary model that gives rise to this "exogenous" way in which stigma enters
utility. In particular, work by Axeirod (1984) and Hayek (1973) on evolutionary competition suggests that, if children
born out-of-wedlock are at a competitive disadvantage, the stigma associated with out-of-wedlock births would be
sufficiently high to eliminate such births for the vast majority of agents, but that it would be sufficiently 'forgiving"
such that, if a woman gave birth out-of-wedlock, the sanctions, while unpleasant, were not extraordinarily punitive.
14 The connection between changing economic conditions and the evolution of values has been identified as importantby
others. Greif (1995), for example, states that "[slince current behavior is determined by past values, cultural beliefs and
economic costs and benefits of various actions, economic change can, over time, alter values." The interaction of
between economic forces and culture are also clearly acknowledged in the sociology literature (see, for example,
Schelling (1971)).
15 Sociologists often refer to the latter process as internalization. See Jones (1984) and references therein for amore
detailed discussion.
8observed during their formative years.) This produces an intergenerational link between observed
behavior today and societal views about such behavior in all future generations; i.e. the more
prevalent certain types of behavior are today, the more socially acceptable such behavior becomes
tomorrow and each day after. We capture this link in our model by making S a function not only of
behavior in the preceding generation, but of behavior in all previous generations (with the impact of
older generations being discounted more heavily than that of recent ones.) This makes possible an
analysis of policy under different assumptions about the speed with which current behavior changes
underlying values.16
Before proceeding to the specification of the model, we want to distinguish this work from
previous work on welfare stigma by Moffitt (1983), Besley and Coate (1992) and Bird (1996). The
first two of these papers investigate a type of stigma that, while very interesting, is entirely unrelated
to the kind of phenomenon modelled here. In particular, while Moffitt and Besley and Coate
investigate stigma felt by individuals on AFDC because they are seen as accepting public welfare, we
refer in this paper to the stigma of having a child out-of-wedlock; i.e. rather than modelling welfare
stigma, we model the illegitimacy stigma as it relates to welfare policy.'7 Bird (1996), on the other
hand, investigates the changes in societal norms against out-of-wedlock births by those on welfare,
not against illegitimacy in general. In the process, he deviates substantially from the sociological
origins of our approach by modelling norms as the political solution to a coordination game in which
voters seek to prevent socially costly behavior by the poor by setting up norms that are themselves
costly to enforce. Thus, agents do not have the kinds of "interdependent" utility functions described
in Figure 1, and norms are chosen rather than resulting from an intergenerational evolutionary
process.18
16 The sociological literature suggests that values tend not to change very abruptly (Williams (1971)).
17 In an interesting related paper, Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1996) investigate the role of this "welfare stigma" (rather
than the "illegitimacy stigma") on the political economy of welfare states. In particular, they assume that living off
one's own work is a social norm, and that this norm is more intensively felt by individuals the greater the fraction of the
population that adheres to the norm. In this sense, they view norms similarly to the view taken in this paper, but the
application is quite different. They demonstrate that, in this setting, the political economy outcome falls into one of two
categories: either the society chooses low taxes and has a minority of citizens receiving transfers, or the society chooses
high taxes and has a majority receiving transfers. In contrast, our paper treats welfare policy as an exogenous factor and
focuses on its impact on the stigma of out-of-wedlock births and the resulting changes in illegitimacy rates.
18 Bird obtains the interesting result in his model that a transferral of AFDC programs from the federal level to local
governments may result in less social pressure against illegitimacy among the poor.
92. The Model
2.1. Base Model Without Welfare
We assume that agents live for one period and differ from one another in two dimensions: (i)
their wage rate (DE=[0,1],and (ii) their intensity of preferences for having children 13€B=[0,l].
Furthermore, the set of agents N is the same in each generation (time period) and is defined to be
Bx￿ (=[0,1]x[0,1]), where agent n=(o,13) is interpreted to be an agent of wage type 0)and
preference type 13.Eachagent n=(o),13) is endowed with one unit of leisure [and chooses
simultaneously both how much leisure to consume (or equivalently how much private good (CER÷)
to consume) and whether to have an out-of-wedlock child (be {0,1}).19 Her utility function is
separable and of the following form:
u't(c,1b;S) =u(c,[)+bf(f3,S) (2.1)
where St is interpreted to be a parameter that is monotonic in the social acceptance of having a child
out-of-wedlock in time period t. This social acceptance parameter S is determined as a function of
the actions of past generations. More precisely,
S=g(K11,K2,...;) = = (l-)6' (2.2)
i=O
where K1 is the fraction of the population N that chooses to have children out-of-wedlock in period t,
and 6€ (0,1] is a discount factor. Note that 5= (l-6)Ki+ 6S1. Furthermore, any steady state S
must lie in the interval [0,11 and can be interpreted as the fraction of N who have a child out-of-
wedlock in the steady state.20
For now, we assume the utility function has the following properties:
1. u is strictly quasiconcave and twice differentiable;
19 At this point, we abstract away from a separate marriage decision by implicitly assuming that utility under marriage is
less than or equal to utility without marriage and without children. Therefore, agents may be indifferent between having a
child within marriage and not having a child at all, or they may strictly prefer not to have children. In Section 5,we
comment on the implications of explicitly adding a marriage decision to the model.
20 In the steady state, Kt =Kt-l=Kt-2=... = Kwhich implies S= (1-6)6' K= (1-3)K —.L—= K.
(1-6)
102. fi0,S) =0;i.e. women with 3=0 derive no utility from having an out-of-wedlock child;
af (f•)￿ 0, i.e. the benefits from having a child increase as social acceptance rises, and
f (•,S)> 0 whenever f(13,S) > 0; i.e. the benefit from having a child increases as
preferences for having children (as represented by 3) become more intense.21
While f thus gives the benefit of having children out-of-wedlock (which might be negative if
social acceptance is low), we also assume that there is a fixed time cost k of having a child; i.e.
choosing b=l implies that the consumer's endowment of time falls from 1 to (1—k).22 A consumer
n=(w,13) in period t therefore faces the following maximization problem (given Si):
max ufl,t(c,1,b;St) = u (c,[) + bf(13,S) subject to c = a)(1-bk-[).23 (2.3)
Since the choice of whether to have a child out-of-wedlock is binary, we can think of each
consumer taking as given the social acceptance parameter S and comparing the indirect utility of not
having a child V(b=0;S) with the indirect utility of having a child V(b=1;S). More precisely, each
consumer n=(oj3) first solves for the optimal level of leisure, holding constant the decision of
whether to have a child (11=1(S)) or not
1o(S) = argmax unt(c,1;0) = u (c,1) subject to c = CJ)(1-1)} (2.4)
(Se) = argmax (unt(c,I;l)= u (c,O +f(,St) subject to c = e(1-k-O). (2.5)
She then compares the two indirect utilities
V(b=0;S)= u°'t(e)(l- 4o (Se)),(S),O) (2.6)
V(b=1;S)= unt(O(1_k_=i (S)),=i (S),l) (2,7)
and chooses whether or not to have a child based on which indirect utility level is greater. Since these
21 One example of a utility function that satisfies these conditions is u0t(c,f) =ai(lx)+bS
22 We have also included a fixed monetary cost in previous versions of this analysis, as well as the option of purchasing
child care. The inclusion of a fixed monetary cost makes out-of-wedlock births less likely for the very poor (in the
absence of welfare programs), while the option of purchasing child care increases the likelihood of out-of-wedlock births
among high wage earners. The resulting analysis does not change significantly beyond this but does become
unnecessarily cumbersome. We therefore focus here on the case where there is only a fixed time cost to having children
and no possibility of purchasing child care.
23 Some readers have suggested that this specification implicitly assumes myopia on the part of consumers because they do
not calculate the future evolution of S. We think that this is an inaccurate interpretation. In particular, agents in the
model only live one period and thus are concerned only about the stigma in that period. Furthermore, their actions have
no impact on the level of social approval.
11indirect utility functions are superscripted by the agent type n=(w,), we can re-write them explicitly
in terms of o and [3; i.e.
V(o,[3;b=0,S) =V'(°)(b=0,S) (2.8)
V(co43;b= 1 ,S) =V'°'1)(b= 1 ,S). (2.9)
By setting them equal to each other and solving for e, we get a function wage([3;S)that
separates those who choose to have children from those who do not. In particular, thefraction of
agents choosing to have children is equal to the area under this function that lies withinthe box of
types Bx1=[0,flx[0,1]. More formally, we can define a new function
0 if wage ([3;St) <0
co(13;St) =wage (13;St)if 0 ￿ wage(f3;S)￿ 1 , (2.10)
1 if wage([3;S)>l
and determine the fraction of agent types having children given a social acceptance level St as an
integral; i.e. K(S) =a([3;S)d13.
Recall that in any steady state equilibrium, i.e. whenever S=S1=S2=.. .=S, the social
approval parameter S is simply the fraction of the population N that is having children out-of-
wedlock in any given period. Thus, a steady state equilibrium occurs when
K(S)=S= ([3;S)d[3. (2.11)
Jo
Boththe steady state number of children and the level of social approval are therefore
determined endogenously through the decisions by individuals who take S as given.
2.11. An Example
Suppose, for example, the utility function for an individual n=(o,[3) were given by






Suppose further that a=O.5andk=O.5. Then V(w,P;b=0,S)=V(o,[;b=l,S) can be solved for
0) to get the function
wage(I3;S) 16 (fSt)2.
This function does not attain a negative value for any (,S)E [0,l]x{O,1], but for values of S
greater than ,itbecomes greater than 1 for some values of .Sincethe highest wage type has a
wage equal to 1, we modify the function to get
wage (f;St) if 16 (s)2￿i
= 2
1 if 16(13Sj>l
Figure 2 illustrates this function for S=-. The shaded region represents the set of types that
choose to have children out-of-wedlock when S=-, and, since the total area of the "type-box" is
equal to 1, the area of this shaded region, J w(;S) d, represents the fraction of agents choosing
to have out-of-wedlock children. For this example, this integral is equal to 0.673, which means that
this could not be a steady state equilibrium (because SF-).
Figure 3 illustrates the entire w(f3,S) function of which Figure 2 is the horizontal slice at
This more general figure shows that, as S rises and thus social approval gets higher, so the share of
out-of-wedlock births goes up (as one would expect). A steady state equilibrium occurs when S =
o(;S)d3; i.e. when the integral of the horizontal slice is equal to the height of that slice. For
the present example, this occurs at two points: S=0 and S=0.786. In other words, with the
parameters and functionalforms assumedin this example, there are two steady states: one in which
no children are born out-of-wedlock,and another in which close to 79 percent of women
chooseto have children out-of-wedlock.
Figure 4(a) provides a second and perhaps more useful illustration. The curve in this figure
13illustrates K(S) -therelationship between S and the number of women choosing to have children
out-of-wedlock. Whenever the curve intersects the 45 degree line from above, a steady State
equilibrium is attained. (When it crosses from below, the candidate equilibrium is highly unstable.)
For this example, the curve crosses the 45 degree line from above twice: once at S=O, and then again
at S=O.786.24
2.2. Adding Public Assistance (AFDC) to the Model
We now model two important aspects of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
First, the only women to qualify for a cash payment of PE R are those with children. Second, for
every dollar earned in the labor market, welfare benefits are reduced by ir€ [0,1]. AFDC is therefore
defined as (P,7c)E Rx[0,l] where the first term indicates the amount of the cash payment to a
single mother with no outside income, and the second term indicates the rate at which P is reduced
as labor income rises.
Because going on public assistance means that labor income is taxed at an effective rate of it,it
is not necessarily the case that a woman who chooses to have a child out-of-wedlock will receive
AFDC. Rather, the introduction of AFDC=(P,ir) means that women face a new budget constraint
c = max (bP +(l-bp)w(l-bk-l),w(1-bk-l)) (2.12)
bE{O,l }
whichmay be kinked when b=1 •25Thus,when making their labor/leisure choice, women who
have a child implicitly choose whether or not to go on public assistance. For low wage types, the
first term in the above equation always dominates for all levels of leisure (in which case the budget
constraint is not kinked), while for high wage types, the first term dominates for high levels of
leisure while the second dominates for low levels of leisure.
Just as we were able to think of the problem without AFDC as a two step problem, we can
now think of the case with AFDC as a three step problem. Each agent takes the social acceptance
24 Theshape of the curve in Figure 4(a) (as well as many of the other figures that follow) is familiar to those having worked
with threshold models. In section 2.3 we discuss in more detail what conditions give rise to this shape. For now, we
merely note that it arises primarily from the underlying uniform distribution of types in the ox space. This distribution
results in a bell-shaped distribution of threshold points which naturally gives rise to the sigmoid shape of the
relationship illustrated in Figure 4(a). Since the underlying uniform distribution of types seems natural, we continue with
this assumption.
25Thiskink disappears when b=O as the two arguments collapse into one.
14parameter St as given and compares the indirect utility of not having a child V(b=0;S), the indirect
utility of having a child and going on public assistance V(b=1 ;welfare,S) and the indirect utility of
having a child and not going on public assistance V(b=1;no welfare,S). This is done by first
calculating the optimal levels of leisure in each case (o(S), 1ri(welfare;St) and 4=1(no
welfare;S), and then substituting these into the utility function. Person n's indirect utility of having a
child is then simply the higher of the indirect utility levels of having a child with and without welfare:
V'1(b= 1 ;S) =max{ V(b= 1 ;welfare,S) ,V'(b= 1 ;no welfare, S) }. (2.13)
As before, we can therefore get indirect utility functions of not having a child (V(co,;b=O,S)) and
of having a child (V(o,3;b=1,S)) in terms of (o,f), set them equal to one another, solve for
wage(13;S), and derive D(;St) which separates within the type space Bx=0,1}x[0,1] those who
choose to have a child from those who choose not to. Thus, given o(l:S), we now can determine
the steady state equilibrium of S in the same way as before.
2.21. An Example (Continued)
In the example in Section 2.11, we implicitly assumed an AFDC program (P,,t)=(0,O)).
Suppose that instead we had assumed a program (P,ir)=(O.1, 0.5) (i.e. a program that offers cash
assistance of 0.1 to mothers who receive no outside income and that reduces this amount by 50 cents
for every dollar of labor income). Figure 4(b) illustrates how the relationship between the social
approval S and the number of agents choosing to have a child changes when a welfare program of
this type is introduced in the context of our example. For this particular specification of the utility
function and the assumed parameters, the low steady state in Figure 4(a) disappears, while the high
steady state equilibrium S grows to 0.859 (from S=0.786 without AFDC).
What is perhaps more interesting than the steady state equilibria themselves is the transition
path to the new steady state. Suppose that, within the context of this example, we started with the
low steady state equilibrium (S=0) and introduced the program (0.1, 0.5) into the system in time
period t=10. Then Figure 4(c) illustrates the transition path of S for =0.9, the discount factor in
equation (2.2), and Figure 4(d) shows the number of individuals who choose to have a child in each
period along this transition paths (Kr).
152.3 Some Intuition on the Relationship between K and S
Many of the conclusions derived in Section 4 will arise from the existence of a high S and low
S steady state in the absence of AFDC. The existence of two (and only two) such steady states is due
to the shape of the relationship K(S) =o(3;S)d (graphed in Figure 4(a) for the example in the
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previous section.) Assuming that the stigma attached to having an out-of-wedlock birth when S=0 is
sufficiently high, K(0)=0 represents one steady state. Other steady states arise whenever the function
K crosses the 45 degree line from above. If the function K has a concave or a sigmoid (by which we
mean convex for low S and concave for high S) shape, there will be at most one other steady state.
We argue in this section, that this is in fact to be expected under reasonable assumptions regarding
the underlying distribution of types and the underlying utility function. We begin by underscoring
the role played by the subutility function f(,S), and then proceed to discuss the role played by the
distributional assumptions over the underlying type space.
2.31. The Role of f(/3,S)
To focus on the role played by the function f, we assume that the subutility function over
consumption and leisure is Cobb-Douglas with cx=0.5, and we continue to assume that each point in
the type space represents one agent (i.e. a uniform distribution of types). The Cobb-Douglas form
with a=0.5 implies that, for any fixed S. the function graphed in Figure 2 is given by
0 iff(f,S) ￿ 0
U)(3,S) =c[f(,S)]2 if 0 <f(,S) <c-112where c=4k2.(2.14)
1 iff(13,S)￿c-"2
Therefore, whenever o(,S)€ (0,1),
=2cft,S)f(,S)>0 (2.15)
because > 0 when f(3,S)>0. The function in Figure 2 is therefore always upward
sloping.26 Furthermore, for e(13,S)E (0,1),
26 This is true unless the utility of having a child out-of-wedlock isnegative (f(.S)￿O) or the highest wage (of 1) has been
reached, in which case the slope is 0.
16o(,S)=2cftj,S)af(,S)>0 (2.16)
af(,S) . .
because > 0. Thus, as S increases, the function in Figure 2 rotates up (as the vertical





which is greater than zero if and only if
(afs))2>f(S)a2fU3s) . (2.18)
Under the assumption of a uniform distribution of types, the relationship in Figure 4(a) simply piots
K(S) =U)(t3,S)dfI This is equal to the area under the function c [f (13;S)J
2that lies within the
Jo
dK(S) unit square (which represents the type space.) Given (2.16),dS
> 0 whenever K(S) lies in the
interval (0,1); i.e. K is an increasing function of S.
Note that so long as (1,S)E (0,1), J (,S) d =
J
c(;S)]2d. If w(1,S)=l,
however, jo,S)d ￿ jc[f(;5)] 2d This implies that, as long as 0(1,S)E (0,1), d2K(S)>
0 if and only if (2.18) holds, but if o(1,S)=1, (2.18) is no longer sufficient (but still necessary) for
convexity of K(S). We will therefore adopt the following terminology: if o(1,S)=1 for some S<1,
we will say that "the constraint of the type space is binding" for that value of S.
Implication 1: For low values of 5, condition (2.18) is a necessary and sufficient condition for K(S)
to be convex. For high enough 5, however, condition (2.18) is merely necessary but
no longer sufficient for K(S) to be convex. Thus, concavity of K can result from
either a violation of (2.18) or the binding constraint of the type space at high S.
17We can now investigate the shape of K(S) under different assumptions aboutf 1ff is convex
a2f(R S) in S, then > 0 which implies condition (2.18) is automatically satisfied when
w( 1 ,S)e (0,1) (which is guaranteed to hold for low values of S); i.e.
Implication 2: 1ff is convex in 5, K(S) is convex at low values of S.
Furthermore, if o( 1,1) < 1, the type space constraint is never binding and K(S) is convex
throughout (but never crosses the 45 degree line thus leaving us with one steady state at S=0). If
w(1,S) =1for some S<1, however, the type space is binding for high values of S. Thus, if o(l,S)
=1for S sufficiently below 1, K(S) must become concave at some level of S. In addition, unless
a2.'' ' increasesdramatically over a small interval after K(S) becomes concave, there is a strong
as2
tendency for the concavity of K to be sustained (as S increases) because of the increasingly binding
constraint of the type space. Under the resulting expected sigmoid shape of K, there exists at most
one steady state in addition to the low-S steady stateS=0.27
Implication 3: 1ff is convex in S and w(1,S) =1for S sufficiently below 1, K(S) becomes
concave at some level of 5, and there is a strong tendency for K to remain concave as
S increases (due to the increasingly binding constraint of the type space).
If, on the other hand, f is concave in 5, (2.18) may be violated even at low values of S. Thus,
d2K(S)may become negative well before S is high enough such that o(1,S) =1which is then re-
dS2
enforced when S is high enough for the type space constraint to be binding.
Implication 4: If f is concave in 5, then K(S) ,nay be concave or convex at low values of S.
However, once it is concave, there is again a strong tendency for it to continue to be
concave as S increases.
27 This second steady state will lie strictly below S=1 unless f is not a function of 13. An example where f is not afunction
of 13 is given by the highest curve graphed in figure 5(b).
18Thus, if f is either convex or concave throughout, it is reasonable to expect that, in addition to the
low-S steady state, there is at most one additional steady state at S>O.28
We may, however, think that it is not reasonable for f to be either concave or convex
throughout. Sociological evidence suggests that it is plausible, for example, that the marginal impact
on social stigma of an additional out-of-wedlock birth is increasing when the total number of out-of-
wedlock births is small, but that, once the total number of out-of-wedlock births is large, this
marginal impact begins to decline. This translates into a functional form forf that is initially convex
but eventually concave. The basic intuition for the sigmoid shape of K(S) under these circumstances,
however, continues to apply. Implication 2 suggests that K(S) will be convex for low values of S,
while Implications 3 and 4 suggest that it will be concave for higher values of S. This leads us to a
general conclusion regarding the relationship of K(S) with respect to the functionf:
Implication 5: 1ff is(i) concave throughout,
(ii) convex throughout or
(iii) convex for low values of S and concave for high values of S,
then it is reasonable to expect there to be at most two steady states.
The result would not hold as clearly, however, if f were initially concave and then convex.
This would imply a high impact of the first out-of-wedlock birth, followed by declining marginal
impact of additional out-of-wedlock births and then an increase after some number of births. There is
little evidence to suggest that such a functional form is reasonable. If this were the underlying shape
of f, however, a third steady state is plausible. Similarly, additional switches between convexity and
concavity off may (but usually do not) cause additional increases in the number of possible steady
states. However, we should note that the binding constraint imposed by the type space limits the
number of potential steady states. As soon as o(1,S) =1,there is a strong tendency for K to be
concave regardless of what shape f takes because of the increasingly binding constraint imposed by
the type space. Thus, it is extremely unlikely for there to be more than one steady state at S>O.5.29
28 While it is theoretically possible in these cases for K(S) to cross the 45degreeline from above more than once, it
requires not only abrupt changes in the shape off (as mentioned above), but also that these abrupt changes happen at
just the right levels of S to cause K(S) to oscilate around the 45degreeline. A formal proof of the intuition presented here
would involve regularity conditions on the third derivative of f. At this point, we simpiy note that it is extremely
difficult to find functional forms for f that are either concave or convex throughout and that give rise to more than two
steady states. In fact, we were unable to find any such functional forms in many attempted simulations.
29 We were, in fact, unable to findany functional forms (other than the most extreme) which yielded more than two overall
steady states.
192.32. The Role of the Underlying Distribution of Types
So far,wehave assumed that the distribution of types over the type space is un.
exists one agent for each point in the type space. In the previous section, we h
assumption to argue that, under most reasonable specification of the functionf, the model gives rise
to at most two steady states in the absence of AFDC. The arguments presented above become
stronger if we replace the uniform distribution assumption with a unimodal distribution of agents
across the type space. In that case, for low values of S, K(S) will increase faster than before, while it
will increase more slowly for high values of S. A functional form for f that yields a linear
relationship between K and S, for example, will therefore now yield a convex relationship for low
values of S and a concave relationship for high values of S. Altering the assumption of an underlying
uniform distribution over the type space to a unimodal distribution therefore strengthens the
argument made in the previous section that any reasonable functional form for f will yield the
required shape for K that gives rise to at most two steady states. Thus, the arguments in the previous
section remain largely valid under all reasonable distributions, by which we mean all unimodal
distributions. If the underlying distribution of types has multiple peaks, however, additional steady
states become plausible.30
3. Comparative Statics of the Model
In Sections 2.11 and 2.21, we provided a specific example to clarify the model used in the
paper. We now introduce a somewhat more general specification of the underlying utility function
and demonstrate the robustness of the initial intuitions from the example as well as the robustness of
the intuitions regarding the shape of K(S) developed in Section 2.3. In particular, we specify a
utility function of the following form:
ur.t(c,[,b;St) =o(+by1I3'2(S'3+y4). (3.1)
Note that this collapses to the specification in the previous example when y1=y2=y3=1 and y4=O.
Each new parameter accomplishes a slightly different aim:
30 Foran illustration of the impact of other types of threshold point distributions, see Granovetter and Soong (1983) who
point out that more than two steady states are possible if the underlying threshold point distribution has multiple peaks.
20• t changes the importance of the second term of the utility function (children) relative to the
first (consumption and leisure).
• 2 changes the degree to which different preferences for children matter; when set to zero, for
example, all types have the same inherent preferences for children, while larger values of
72 increase the degree to which a high type differs from a low 3 type. (Largervalues of
12 also decrease the overall impact of children on utility for allor 1.)
• 73 alters the shape of the impact of changes in the social approval parameter S; a value of 1
implies a linear impact in the sense that a marginal change in the value of St has the same
effect on utility for all initial values of S; a value of less than 1 implies that marginal
changes in S are more important as S gets smaller, while a value greater than 1 implies
that that marginal changes in S become more important as S gets larger.
• y determines at what level of social approval out-of-wedlock children become "goods"; i.e.
when y is negative, then out-of-wedlock children are "bads" for low values of S. Thus,
74 determines the level of "stigma" when no one has chosen out-of-wedlock births.
3.]. Comparative Statics without AFDC
We continue with the assumption of a uniform distribution of types and illustrate in Figures 5a
through 5d the change in the shape of K(S) in the absence of welfare (i.e. (P,ir)=(0,0)) as these
four parameters vary and as we keep a =k=0.5.In Figure 5a, for example, starting with the
highest function in the picture, we illustrate the effects of loweringfrom1.5 to 0.5 in increments
of 0.1 while keeping 72=73=1 and 74=0. (Higher curves correspond to higher levels of y.) Unless
'y1, the weight on the second term in the utility function, becomes small, the model continues to have
two steady states; one at S=0 and one at S>0 (where the latter steady state is increasing in y1.) More
precisely, at 70.67, both S=0 and S 0.5 18 are steady state equilibria, while for values ofless
than 0.67, only S=0 remains as a steady state. Thus, as 7 falls, there is a discontinuous change in
the number and nature of the steady state equilibria at some relatively low value of y. Figure Sb
illustrates a similar discontinuity as 72' the exponent on ,increasesfrom 0 to 2 in 0.25 increments
(while 71=73=1 and 74=0). (Higher curves correspond to lower values of 72) While at 721.81 both
S0.404 and S=0 are steady states, for values of 72 greater than 1.81, no strictly positive steady
21state exists. Here, the larger y2, the smaller is the effect of for any type (other than 3=0or1) and
the more pronounced are the differences between different types in terms of the impact of a child on
utility. Therefore, as 72 rises, the K(S) falls (fewer individuals desire a child given S) and gets
shallower (because different types respond less similarly). Again, two steady states are common for
most values of 12'withthe higher steady state rising as 12 falls.
While 'y1 and 12 place weights on various parameters of the utility function, 73 determines the
nature of the effect of social acceptance as expressed in the actions of prior generations. In Figure 5c,
we illustrate the effect of altering 'y. (Higher curves correspond to lower values of 73.) In particular,
for values of 7 greater than 1 (with 71=12=1 and 74=0), the marginal impact of additional agents
having children out-of-wedlock rises as the number of unwed mothers rises, while for values of y
less than 1, this marginal impact falls. As the value of 13 rises (from 0.5 to 1.5 in 0.25 increments),
the curve in Figure 5c becomes shallower due to the less rapid impact of other people's past actions
on individual utility. As before, the result of two steady states is fairly robust to changing values of
y unless y rises above 1.75 in which case only one steady state (S=0)exists. (For 731.75,
S0.67 is a steady state.)
In contrast to the parameters discussed thus far, y determines at what level of social acceptance
out-of-wedlock children become "goods" (rather than "bads"); i.e. it exogenously sets the degree of
stigma felt by individuals when they are the only ones to have chosen an out-of-wedlock birth
(S=0). Clearly, if y <0,children are bads for values of St close to zero, while for 74> 0, having a
child, while being costly, always yields positive utility. Figure Sd, then, illustrates the effect of
changing 74 (with 11=12=73=1).For all 74 ￿ 0, S=0 is, of course, always a steady state equilibrium.
As 7 rises above 0, however, children now become "goods" for all levels of S. Therefore, even
when S=0, agents with wages close to zero choose to have a child which implies that S=0 is no
longer a steady state equilibrium. For values of 7 close to zero, however, there still exists a steady
state equilibrium close to 0 as well as a steady state equilibrium substantially above zero; i.e. for
positive 74 close to zero, the curve in Figure 5d would cross from above twice. (This is not
pictured.) In particular, for the parameters chosen in Figure 5d, so long as 0<y4￿0.04, a steady state
equilibrium 0<S.czo.018 (as well as a steady state equilibrium S>0.785) exist. However, for 74>
0.04 ,onlylarge positive steady state equilibria that are increasing in y arise. At the same time, if 74
22<0 and becomes large in absolute value, then S=0 is the only steady state equilibrium. (This occurs
for values below 4-0.l8 (where S=0.608 is the smallest possible high-S steady state equilibrium).
Finally, we have thus far kept a and k fixed 0.5. In Figures 6a and 6b, we vary these
parameters holding y1=y2=y3=1and4=O. Varying a between 0.7 and 0.3 in Figure 6a (while
keeping k=O.5) seems to have relatively little overall impact on K(S), while changing k, the time cost
of having a child, has a more dramatic impact (where a=0.5). As one would expect, raising the cost
of having a child decreases K for any level of social acceptance S. The result of two steady states,
however, is robust to most of these changes and disappears only when k rises above 0.75 (where
S=0.503). Thus, when the cost of having a child becomes (unreasonably) high, only S=0 is a steady
state equilibrium.
From the simulations reported in Figures 5 and 6, we can therefore reach the following
conclusion concerning the more general specification of the utility function:
Conclusion 1: •Formost parameters, the model has two steady states: A low-S steady state in
which few or no women choose to have an out-of-wedlock child, and a high-S
steady state in which a sizable fraction (more than 40%) choose to have one.
• The two steady state result maycollapseand only one low-S steady state may
appear as the relative utility weight on children (y )falls, as the effect of the desire
of having children (J3)islower and varies less among different types (though
higher values of '/'2)'asthe marginal effect on utility of additional out-of-wedlock
children in past generations rises (through higher values of y3), as the level of
stigma of being the only person to have an out-of-wedlock birth rises (through y4),
and as the cost of having a child (k) increases.
• Also, as the utility of being the only person to have an out-of-wedlock child gets
more positive (through 74) the two steady state result breaks down and only a
high-S steady state appears.
3.2. Comparative Statics with AFDC
In Figures 5 and 6 we considered how K(S) changes as different parameters within the utility
23function change or as the cost of having a child changes in the absence of AFDC. Next we proceed
to discuss the impact of changing the nature of the welfare program (P,it). In particular, in Figure
7a we change the size of the cash welfare program P, and in Figure 7b we vary the rate at which
welfare payments are reduced as labor income rises. Throughout, we hold y1=y2='y3=l and y4=-O.l
(thus making an out-of-wedlock child a "bad" when S<0.l), as well as c=k=O.5.
Not surprisingly, higher values of P in Figure 7a (with it=0) increase K, the number of
agents choosing to have children, for any given St and thus drive the positive steady statecloser to 1.
In fact, for P=0.49, S=1 is the only steady state equilibrium (as the financial incentive to be a single
mother becomes very strong). Furthermore, as P rises above 0.054, the low-S steady state
equilibrium vanishes leaving the model only with a high-S steady state. (For P=0.054, the low-S
steady state is S=0.132.)31
While the level of the cash payment P thus seems to have a major impact on K(S), the rate at
which P is reduced as labor income rises (it)hasmuch less of an impact. In Figure 7b, we illustrate
this relationship for ir=0 and 'r= 1 (given P=0. 1). While raising itdecreasesK for any given S, the
effect is relatively weak, especially for low values of S (where mainly low wage types are choosing
to have a child). Raising itthushas a small negative impact on the value of the high-S steady state
(as well as the low-S steady state when this exists.)
Conclusion 2: As AFDC aid increases, the low-S steady state vanishes and the high-S steady state
is increasing in the amount of the aid and decreasing in the degree to which this aid
fails when labor income rises.
4. The Transition Path when AFDC is Introduced
Since the desirability of having out-of-wedlock children is determined in considerable part by
the number of others who have had children in the past, the behavioral effects of introducing a cash
assistance program that only single mothers are eligible for can be expected to grow with time. Since
the effect of it(therate at which benefits are reduced when labor income rises) appears to play a
minor role in the model, we assume throughout this section that ir=1 (as it is in many US states).
Furthermore, we continue to assume cx=k=0.5 and, for purposes of illustration as well as for the
31 When 4=Oinsteadof -0.1, the highest Pconsistentwith a low steady state is 0.01 (where S=0.0325).
24sake of brevity, we assume 'Y1=12=13=1• (None of the qualitativeresults change if we alter these
assumptions.) Since the model is seeking to develop anexplanation for the rise in out-of-wedlock
births from very low pre-AFDC levels, we arguethat the only empirically relevant set of
specifications are those that allow for theexistence of a low-S pre-AFDC steady state. Therefore, y
cannot be above 0.04 as this would result in theexistence of only a high-S steady state (see Figure
5d). We start by assuming ?4=-O.l and discusshow results change as 14 changes.32
Throughout, we begin in the no-welfare ((P,7t)=(0,0)) caseand the low-S steady state
equilibrium, then introduce a welfare program (P,l)and investigate the transition path to the new
steady state. Furthermore, we investigate proposals toeliminate AFDC once the economy has settled
into the new steady state as well as proposals toeliminate or reduce AFDC at points along the
transition path. In many cases, we report results for differentvalues of 6 (which determines the
length of time the transition path takes to converge tothe new steady state).
4.1. Introducing AFDC in a Low-SSteadyState
Under the current assumptions, two steady state equilibriaexist: S=0 and S=0.738. We
assume that prior to the introduction of AFDC,the economy is in the low-S steady state in which no
one chooses to have an out-of-wedlockchild (because such children are "bads".) Suppose that, at
time t=lO, a cash assistance program (P,ir)=(0.l,l) isintroduced. Figure 8a then illustrates the
fraction of individuals choosing to have an out-of-wedlock birthin each time period under different
assumptions of S. Since higher values of S dampenthe effect of each generation's actions on the next
period's level of S. such higher values ofS lead to dramatically longer transition paths.33 Of
course, regardless of 6, the transition path eventuallyreaches the same new steady state (which is, in
this case, S=0.839). Note that this steady state is only modestly higherthan the high-S steady state
without welfare and that this is the only steady state for awelfare program of this size (see Figure 7).
Figure 8b proceeds to illustrate the level of Sinduced by the changing behavior along the transition
path under the different assumptions of6.
32 As we argued in footnote 13, we can think of this as having arisen from an evolutionary process in which the low-S
societies out-performed high-S societies and thus became the dominantcultures we observe prior to large scale
government intervention. Regardless of how we originallyarrived at this low-S steady state, however, it remains the
empirically relevant pre-AFDC steady state to consider.
3 Since the sociology literature suggests that values change slowly, we place more credence on values of close to 1.
25Now suppose instead that a more modest welfareprogram of (P,ic)=(0.05,l) had been
introduced at time t 10. Figures 8c and 8d are then the analogs to Figures 8a and 8brespectively.
Note from Figure 7 that with P=0.05, two steady states exist under the welfareprogram, with a
low-S steady state of S0.1. Thus, the introduction of this smaller cashpayment leads to a
significantly smaller number of out-of-wedlock births than the largerprogram discussed above
because the higher steady state is never attained. The more negative the value of'y4, the greater the
cash benefit can be and still yield a low-S steady state; i.e. thegreater the initial steady state stigma,
the more generous the welfare system can be and still maintain relatively low levels ofillegitimacy.
With the current 74=-O. 1, the highest P can be without resulting inillegitimacy rates significantly
above 10% is approximately As 74 approaches 0.04, the level of cash assistance required to
reach the high-S steady state approaches 0, while for a value of 74=-0.2, itcan be as high as 0.1.
Conclusion 3: Assuming the economy starts in a steady state close to S= 0 withno AFDC, the
introduction of AFDC leads over time to substantially higher levelsof illegitimacy if
the cash payment is above a certain amount. If it is not above thisamount, then even
over time, AFDC leads to only a modest rise in illegitimacy. The minimum amount
of cash assistance required to attain the high-illegitimacy result is inversely relatedto
and tends to be small relative to the level ofAFDC cashpayments we observe.
Figure 8 thus illustrates that the introduction of AFDC can lead toincreasing levels of
illegitimacy over time even as the AFDC benefit levels remain constant. Thus, since "values"change
along the transition path, out-of-wedlock children that start as "bads" prior to the introductionof
AFDC become increasingly desirable "goods" as time passes.35 Thiscauses illegitimacy to increase
not only among the poor but in the society as a whole, and not onlyamong those who choose to
actually go on public assistance, but also among those who continue to work withoutreceiving
welfare benefits.
Given that the average pre-AFDC income in the model is 0.25, this level of cashsupport is 20% of the average income.
Since most AFDC programs (when considered jointly with other benefits tied toeligibility under AFDC) have
historically provided higher levels of support, we find P—O.l to be a more relevant level of assistance.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may well be consistent with trends in thepast 30 years. While it is difficult, for
example, to think of a teenager proudly bringing her out-of-wedlock child to school in the 1950's (whenwe would argue
such children were "bads"), this happens frequently today. Slarly, it is difficult to imagine schools in the 1950's
offering day care programs for small children of high school students, whereas this is increasingly thecase, especially in
inner cities, today. Thus, while single parents, especially teenagers, used to be hidden from thepublic eye due to the
stigma they and their children faced, today they are far from driven into seclusion bypeer pressure and social attitudes.
26We next turn to the policy problem of reversing this increase in illegitimacy, assumingeither
that we have reached the new steady state or that we are currently somewhere on thetransition path
to the new steady state.
4.2. Reforming or Eliminating AFDC to Reduce Illegitimacy
Given that we restrict ourselves to parameterizations for which the economy was originally
(prior to the initial introduction of AFDC) in a low-S steady state,there are now two distinct cases
we must consider: (i) cases in which there is only one pre-AFDC steady state (asin the case of large
negative values of y4 in Figure 5d), and (ii) cases in which there are multiple pre-AFDCsteady states
(as in the case of most parameters we have modelled thus far). The former category representscases
in which the stigma of being in the minority is very high with respect to other parametersin the
model, while the latter represents cases in which there is still a substantial but less extreme amountof
stigma. As we have demonstrated in Section 3, a wide range ofreasonable parameters -infact, we
would argue, most reasonable sets of parameters -putthe model into the latter category in which
two initial (pre-AFDC) steady states exist. Up to now, however, none of the analysisof transition
paths has critically relied on the distinction between these two cases. In particular, regardlessof the
existence of a second steady state, the conclusions with respect to the introduction of AFDC remain
the same: transition paths are such that substantial increases in illegitimacy are perfectly consistent
with the model long after the introduction of some fixed cash assistance program. However, now
that we have arrived at the point of discussing potential reforms aimed at reducing or eliminating the
problem of illegitimacy, there appears a clear distinction between the casesin which there initially
existed a second steady state and cases in which there did not.
If AFDC is eliminated at any time, either along the transition path or once the new steady state
has been reached, illegitimacy will always decline to zero in cases of type (i) where the stigma of
being in the minority (14) is sufficiently high to result in only one pre-AFDC steady stateand where
that steady state occurs at S=O. There may be a long transition to the S=O steady state from such an
elimination of AFDC when values of are high, but there is nothing to keep S from eventually
returning back to 0; i.e. illegitimacy induced by AFDC is completely reversiblein the long run. High
values of 14 thus represent cases in which stigma plays such a large role that AFDC cannot
27permanently alter social values through fmancial incentives unlessthese fmancial incentives remain in
place indefinitely (or unless it is exogenously assumedthat it is more difficult to return to the initial
steady state than it was to deviate from it at the inception of AFDC).
Conclusion 4a: If the stigma of being in the minority is sufficiently high, i.e. if y4is negative and
sufficiently large in absolute value, the elimination of AFDC resultsin a transition
path to a new steady state of S=O. This is true regardless ofwhether AFDC is
eliminated along the initial transition path to the new steady state, or once the new
steady state has been attained.
For several reasons, however, economies in which this stigma is not of the required magnitude
and which therefore have multiple initial (pre-AFDC) steady states, are of moreinterest. First, we
have demonstrated in Section 3 that under most reasonable specifications, themodel in fact has two
such steady states. Second, a conventional economic model of AFDC (without stigma or peer
effects) suggests that, to the extent that increases in illegitimacy are due to AFDC,the elimination of
AFDC will result in the elimination of the illegitimacy problem. This conventional conclusion
remains largely intact if stigma is extreme enough to place our model in the first category,but it fails
to hold in the large number of cases in which stigma is not sufficiently extreme.We therefore
proceed to concentrate on cases in which two initial steady statesexist.
4.2]. Eliminating AFDC at the New Steady State Equilibrium
Suppose that the parameters are such that the economy does notfall into the case described in
Conclusion 4a; i.e. suppose that two initial (pre-AFDC) steady states exist, of which oneis
characterized by a low S. This occurs for cases in which 74 is either slightly positive (in which case a
low-S steady state above 0 exists), or 'y4 is negative (implying S=0 is the low-S steady state
equilibrium) but not large enough in absolute value to eliminatethe second high-S steady state. For
purposes of illustration and for consistency,wecontinue with the parameterization used to derive
results in Figure 8 (ot=k=O.5, y1=12=731and74=-0.l). As in Figure 8, we again consider two
welfare programs: (P,ir)=(O.1,l) and (P,ir)=(0.05,1).
First suppose that (P,ir)=(O.l,1). From Figure 8a, we know that this cash payment of0.1 is
28sufficiently high to eliminate a low-S steady state and thus propels the economy along atransition
path leading to S=O.839. In Figure 9a, we assume =O.75and illustrate the fraction of agents
choosing to have an out-of-wedlock birth in each period startingwith time t=0 before AFDC,going
through the introduction of AFDC at time t=l0 (and the followingtransition path to the new steady
state), and ending with the elimination of AFDC in period t=60 (and the followingtransition path to
the final steady state.) Figure 9b shows a similar transition for S. Given that theintroduction of the
AFDC program led to a steady state substantially above S=0(andalso above the second positive
steady state without welfare (S=0.738)), eliminating the program atthe new steady state (of
S=0.839) does relatively little to reduce the problem of illegitimacy. A sufficientnumber of agents
are having children out-of-wedlock in the S=0.839 steady state to ensurethat such children are far
removed from being the "bads" they were at t=0. The change in behavior along the transition path
thus increased the desirability of out-of-wedlock children to a point where most agents are no longer
choosing this behavior because of the financial incentives in AFDC; in fact, a largenumber of agents
choose not to participate in AFDC despite being qualified if they did not work. With this changein
the nature of how out-of-wedlock children are viewed, the elimination of AFDC, while reducingthe
illegitimacy rate somewhat, stops well short of eliminating out-of-wedlockbirths.
Figures 9c and 9d illustrate the analogous transition paths for the caseof small cash benefit
programs. These figures continue Figures 8cand 8d in which we modelled a welfare program
(P,ir)=(O.05,1) that was sufficiently small to allow for the existence of a low-S steady state.From
Figure 7a, it is clear that K(S) shifts up as P rises, and that therefore any K(S)with a positive P
lies above K(S) with P=0 and does not cross it. Thus, if the welfare program is sufficiently small to
allow for a low-S steady state with the program, that steady state occurs at a point to the left of the
unstable equilibrium without AFDC that appears when the curve (with P=0) crosses the 45 degree
line from below. Thus, the AFDC steady state with low values of P lies in the region in which the
elimination of the program will induce the number of agents who choose to have children out-of-
wedlock to decline to 0. This is dramatically illustrated in Figure 9c in which the number of agents
choosing to have an out-of-wedlock birth falls to zero as soon as the AFDC programis eliminated at
t=60. Note that, for this example, the steady state equilibrium under AFDC still occurs in a region in
which out-of-wedlock children are "bads" (S lies slightly below 0.1), which means that removing
29the financial incentives to have out-of-wedlock births removes allbenefits to such behavior. With
other parameterizations, it may occur that a low-S steady state arisesunder low values of P for
which S is nevertheless high enough to cause out-of-wedlockchildren to become "goods".
However, so long as the AFDC steady state lies below the unstable equilibriumwithout AFDC, the
elimination of AFDC still leads back to the initial, pre-AFDC, low-S steady state (althoughperhaps
not quite as quickly). Qualitatively, then, the case of relativelylow levels of cash assistance is
similarl to the case in which there is no high-S steady state to begin with:the elimination of AFDC
leads back to the original low-S steady state.
Conclusion 4b: in cases where two steady states exist under no AFDC, if thecash assistance level
P is sufficiently high, the elimination of AFDC at the new steady state leads to only
a marginal reduction in illegitimacy to levels far short ofthe original (pre-AFDC)
level. if the cash assistance amount is sufficiently low, however, the elimination of
AFDC leads back to the original ('pre-AFDC) steady state. Thus, as AFDC levels
rise, the levels of illegitimacy they induce may become irreversible.
Finally, we proceed to investigate reforming AFDC along the transition path.
4.22. Reducing or Eliminating AFDC Payments to Single Mothers Along the TransitionPath
The elimination of cash assistance for single mothers will, as previously suggested, lead back
to the original steady state whenever either (i) there does not exist a high-S steady statein the absence
of AFDC or (ii) the payment P was relatively small. This is true whether the program iseliminated
at the new AFDC steady state or along the transition path to that steady state.We therefore consider
here only the case in which the model is parameterized in such a way as to yield two steady states
without welfare and in which the AFDC payment is sufficiently high to yield a high-S steady state.
For illustration, we continue with the same parameters as before and assume P=O.l and6=0.75.
One of the most often cited statistics concerning the AFDC program and its impact on
illegitimacy is that over the past two decades, real benefitshave persistently declined while
illegitimacy has continued to rise. This is not, however,inconsistent with an economic model of
AFDC such as ours. Suppose, as before, that (P,ic)=(0.1,l) is introduced at time t=l0, but thatthe
cash assistance is reduced by some percentage x each period after t=lO. Figure lOa comparesthe
30effects of a 0%, a 2%, a 4% and a 10% per-period decline in real benefits on thenumber of out-of-
wedlock births over time, and Figure lOb translates these into corresponding effects on S.As is
evident from the illustrations, a consistent decline in real benefits can still result in increasingout-of-
wedlock births so long as this decline is not too large. (This is true independent ofhow many initial
steady states there are in the model, although the path would eventuallylead back to the original
steady state (as real benefits approach zero) for economies inwhich there is only one such steady
state equilibrium in the absence of AFDC.)
Conclusion 4c: Regardless of how many initial steady states there are in the economy, a persistent
decline in real AFDC benefits after the introduction of the program can be
consistent with an initial increase in illegitimacy. For the class of economies that
have two pre-AFDC steady states, illegitimacy rates may continue to rise
substantially even as AFDC benefits gradually approach zero.
Furthermore, even abrupt eliminations (rather than gradual declines) of real cash benefits to
single mothers need not lead to long-run decreases in out-of-wedlockbirths. Such cuts do lead to
permanent declines in illegitimacy in economies in which thereexists only one initial steady state as
well as economies in which there are multiple steady states but in which the AFDC program is of
modest enough size to lead to a low-S steady state equilibrium with AFDC. But they may be
consistent with long run increases in illegitimacy rates for the large class of economies with two
initial steady states when welfare programs are sufficiently generous to begin with. We illustrate
several instructive examples in Figure 11.
Suppose again that a=k=0.5, y1=y2='y31,'4=0.1and =0.75, and suppose that the
government introduces an AFDC program (P,ir)=(0.1,1)in time period t=10. Furthermore,
suppose the program is terminated T periods afterits inception. Figure 11 illustrates the evolution of
K as well as S for T=12 and T=13. If the program is terminated after acertain point, S will have
evolved to a level that does not permit a return to the original low-S steady state. This critical point
occurs once S has grown past the unstable no-AFDC equilibrium in Figure 5d,and it occurs later
the higher the value of and the lower (more negative) y4. Furthermore, note that regardless of when
the program is terminated, there is an initial decline in the number of out-of-wedlock births, but,
31assuming T is high enough, that decline is reversed once the economy has adjusted tothe shock of
the elimination of the program.36
Conclusion 4d: For the class of economies with two pre-AFDC steady states, thesudden
elimination of AFDC payments to single mothers along the transition path, while
always resulting in a short term decrease in illegitimacy, is accompanied by an
increase in illegitimacy if the program has been in existence sufficiently long. In
that case, illegitimacy levels converge to the higher-S steady state despite the
removal offinancial incentives for out-of-wedlock births.
5. Adding a Marriage Decision to the Model
So far we have abstracted away from explicitly modelling the marriage decision and have
viewed each agent as choosing between two very different states of the world: in one state, the agent
chooses to become a single parent; in the other, she chooses to not have any children. A natural
question that arises, then, is how a third alternative -havinga child within marriage -wouldaffect
the results presented thus far. If the third alternative yields utility equivalent to (or less than) the
second (not having children ),anassumption we have made implicitly throughout, then the model is
a trivial extension giving precisely the same results as found thus far. There are, however,additional
ways in which we might think of modelling marriage that canaid in determining whether the results
presented thus far are robust to adding a non-trivial marriage option to the model.While exploring all
of these ways of incorporating marriage into the model is beyond the scope of this paper, we argue
here that the basic intuitions developed will persist in the presence of a non-trivial marriage choice.
Suppose, for example, that marriage is viewed as a way of removing the stigma of having
children out-of-wedlock but that it is, at the same time, a costly activity. More precisely, suppose that
the utility from having a child within marriage is only a function of 3 and not a function of S, and
that there is a leisure cost of t to marriage (i.e. marriage entails a reduction in the leisure endowment
from 1 to (1-p.)). Figure 12a then illustrates the change in K(S) for different values of p. when the
utility from having a child within marriage is exogenously given as O.5. For p.O,i.e. for costless
36 One could state this more informally in the following way: Once the change in stigma induced by AFDC causes changes
in behavior in the "middle class", even AFDC's el •nation cannot reverse the trend of rising illegitimacy rates.
32marriage, this produces a sharp discontinuity at S=0.5 at which point having achild out-of-wedlock
is sufficiently acceptable to yield precisely the same utility level as having a child within marriage.
Figure 12b demonstrates that at that level of S, the fraction of agents choosing marriagefalls from
0.6 to 0, and all children are born outside marriage for higher values of S. For t>0, the numberof
marriages declines less rapidly as S rises. If the exogenously given utility from having achild within
marriage is not too large, however, there is always some value for S abovewhich the relationship
between K and St is the same as if marriage were not an option, and two steady statesexist as
before. Adding a simple marriage model of this type, therefore, does not alter the qualitative results
described in this paper.37 Furthermore, by introducing heterogeneity in the utility of marriage or the
cost of marriage, more subtle changes in relationships occur, but, again, the qualitativeresults
discussed thus far remain unchanged. The introduction of AFDC can thus dramatically alter the
number of out-of-wedlock births as well as the number of marriages, and this change becomes
permanent for a large class of parametenzations once the programhas been in existence for some
time, even if the program is eventually reformed or eliminated.38
7. Adding a Spatial Dimension to the Model
While we have thus far treated changes in values as a society-wide phenomenon, there is
considerable sociological evidence that the strength of such influences as stigma and social
acceptance is often quite local in nature (Ainlay, Becker andColeman (1986), Jencks and Mayer
(1990), Wilson (1987), Wilson (1991), Crane (1991)). Within the context of the current paper,the
impact of one agent's decision to have an out-of-wedlock birth on the utility of a second agentwho is
faced with a similar choice may therefore depend not only on time (i.e. the number of "generations"
in between the two agents, as in the current model) but also on space (the distance that separates the
two agents).39 The social acceptability of an out-of-wedlock birth in New York, for example, is
We have conducted a similar analysis of including marriage in the model when the cost of marriage is a fixed monetary
cost rather than a time cost. Similar results obtain, although the fixed cost nature changes the set of agents that choose to
get married. (Low wage types can no longer afford to get married in this case.) With this kind of marriage cost, however,
it is easier to obtain high-S steady states in which some marriages still occur.
38 There are, of course, more sophisticated ways to incorporate a marriage choice. Our focus here, however, is on the
interaction of peer and social acceptance parameters with public policy, and a more complex modelling of marriage tends
to obscure the intuitions developed above while not changing the basic conclusions we have reached.
Granovetter and Soong (1983) suggest this spatial dimension in the context of sociological threshold models ("...the
direct influence of others on each individual varies with the distance of others from him") and infer that this might
explain "empirically observed equilibria" with "sharp discontinuities".
33likely to be relatively less affected by a rise in the US illegitimacy rate if this riseis driven by
additional out-of-wedlock births in Los Angeles than if it is driven by changes in local illegitimacy
rates in New York. Similarly, the number of out-of-wedlock births in a wealthy LongIsland
community may have little impact on the social acceptance of such behavior in Harlem, andvice
versa. "Distance" can therefore be interpreted not merely as geographic distance, butalso as an index
indicating the degree of social interaction between neighboringcommunities.40
Depending on the strength of such spatial or intercommunity spillovers, the model is likely to
give somewhat different predictions (which are mapped out in Figure 13). Thus far, wehave
implicitly assumed complete (100%) spillovers; i.e. we have assumed that the actions of any one
individual have the same impact on the level of social acceptance S irrespective of the location of
different agents. Separating agents into communities under this assumption would therefore make no
difference whatsoever: if the introduction of AFDC causes changes in behavior in any community, it
will change the level of S in all communities equally.
The other extreme (0% spilovers) views communities as completely isolated from one another,
each functioning as a separate "society". In that case, the current model is easily extended to include
many communities with many different underlying distributionsof preferences and incomes. While
all communities may initially start in the low-S steady state, the introduction of AFDC will cause
dramatic increases in ifiegitimacy rates in some communities (especially those with a large fraction of
low income agents who are initially most affected by the financial incentives of AFDC) while having
little or no impact in others. The stigma of out-of-wedlock births, even if it was originally the same
in all communities, may thus be significantly different in a poor central city high school than in a
wealthy suburban prep school after some adjustment period. Furthermore, the elimination of AFDC
would have differential impacts in different communities.
In between these extreme perspectives lies the view that intercommunity spillovers are likely to
exist but weaken with distance. Thus, the preferences for out-of-wedlock children in each
community can be represented by a graph similar to Figure 4(a), but the position of the curve will
depend on the illegitimacy rates in other neighboring communities. Initially, all communities may
find themselves in their low-S steady state, where this represents a global steady state across
40 This is also consistent with Murray's (1993) interpretation of the empirical evidence which suggests a role for
"proximate cultures" in determining local illegitimacy rates.
34communities. When AFDC is introduced, it may initially affectbehavior predominantly in the
poorest communities, but the changein behavior in those communities may "spillover" into other
communities by shifting the function in Figure 4(a) up in thosecommunities. If these effects are
strong enough, i.e. if differentcommunities are in sufficient contact for spillovers to play an
important role, then illegitimacy rates may rise evenin rich communities in which no one ever takes
advantage of AFDC.Immunityfrom the effects of AFDC would require both (i) the absence of
relatively poor community members and (ii) the presenceof sufficient geographic or other isolation
to prevent intercommunity spillovers from playing a significantrole. Extending the current model to
allow for such partial spatial spillovers therefore allows for not only stronglocal social influences
but also important social changes across communities. For somecommunities, this will entail a shift
to a higher steady state, while for others it will not be sufficient toeliminate the low steady state. The
addition of a spatial dimension to the model therefore has the potential to explain not onlythe stylized
trends in aggregate out-of-wedlock statistics over time but also in shedding light on strongregional
concentrations of high illegitimacy rates.
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the effects of public policy (AFDC) aimed at helpingindividuals (single
mothers) who are engaging in behavior (giving birth out-of-wedlock)that has not traditionally been
"socially accepted." If "social acceptance" of behavior is afunction of the prevalence of that behavior
in the past, then reducing the costs of "socially unaccepted" behavior through governmentsubsidies
can lead to long run cultural changes that make previously unacceptedbehavior not only accepted but
even desirable. Furthermore, the model developedin this paper suggests that in many instances it
may not be possible to reverse unintended changesin individual behavior by eliminating the program
that brought about these changes.41
More specifically, the model presented in this paper suggests that the introductionof financial
incentives for out-of-wedlock births through AFDC can result in gradual changes inhow illegitimacy
is perceived. This in turn can lead to gradually increasing levelsof illegitimacy and single
motherhood among both AFDC populations as well as those not choosing to acceptAFDC.
41 Similar irreversabilities in other contexts can be found in Greif (1994) and Arthur (1994).
35Furthermore, after a certain time, cultural changes (in terms of how illegitimacyis viewed) may
progress to a point past which eliminationof AFDC does little in the way of reducing the problem of
illegitimacy. These cultural changes may be local in nature and relativelyconfined to socially and
geographically isolated groups, or they may spill over into other groupsand communities. While this
reaffirms the argument long made by conservatives that government social policyin the area of
AFDC may have lead to unintended and undesirable cultural changes, it also suggests thatthose to
the left of the political spectrum may be correct in their assessment that a merealteration or
elimination of AFDC cannot solve the problems conservative reformers are most concernedabout. If
correct, this implies that the solution to rising illegitimacy maylie in other, more subtle policies even
ifAFDCis solely responsible for the rise in illegitimacy over the past quarter century.
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—4FIGURE 3
The Set of Agents Choosing Out-of-Wedlock Births as a Function of S
co(,S)= 16(135)2
(1,1, 1)FIGURE 4
The Number of Children Out-of-Wedlock As a Function of S
(cx=k= 0.5,yi =y'2 == 1,4=0)
(a) (P,it) =(0,0)(NoAFDC) (b)(P,it) =(0.1,0.5)
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(d) Transition Path of K from an Introduction of (P, it)= (0.1,0.5) in Period t=10
Kosf
0 20 40 60 80 100FIGURE 5
The Number of Children Out-of-Wedlock As a Function of S




increments ('y2 == 1,y4 =0)
(Higher y1 =>highercurves)




(b) y2 varies from 2 to 0 in 0.25
increments (y1 == 1,y =0)
(Higher Y2> lowercurves)
(d) y varies from -0.3 to 0.1 in 0.1
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The Number of Children Out-of-Wedlock As a Function of S
Y2Y3 =174=0,(P,it)=(0,0))







0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1







0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1FIGURE 7
The Number of Children Out-of-Wedlock As a Function of S
(ct=k=0.5,y1 Y2=Y3=1,4=—0.1)







0 0.2 0.4 0.6








0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1SFIGURE 8
TransitionPaths When AFDC is Introduced in t=1O
(a=k=0.5,y1=y2=y3=1,y4=—O.1)
(a) Evolution of K1 with (P, it)= (0.1,1) for 6 =0.0,0.6, 0.75, and 0.9
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= (0.1,1) for 6 =0.0,0.6, 0.75, and 0.9
(c) Evolution of K, with (P, it)
K,
t
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FIGURE 9
Transition Paths When AFDC is Introduced in t=1OandEliminated in t=60
(cz=k=0.5,y1=-y2=-13=1,y4=—o.1)
(a) Evolution of K, with (P, it)= (0.1,1) for 6 =0.75/
0 20 40 60 80 100
(b)Evolution of 5, with (P, it)= (0.1,1) for 6 =0.75
(c) Evolution of K, with (P, it)= (0.05,1) for 6 =0.75H.
20 80 100
(0.05,1) for 6 =0.75
t
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
IFIGURE 10
Transition Paths when (P, It) =(0.1,1) is Introduced in t=10 and P Declines in Each




(a) Evolution of K for X =0%,2%, 4%, and l0%*
(b) Evolution of S for X =0%,2%, 4%, and l0%*
t
t
* Note:In the graphs, the transition paths for X =2%do not
extend all the way toward the new steady state. This new steady
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FIGURE 11
Transition Paths when (P, it)= (0.1,1) is Introduced in t=10andTerminated T periods
Thereafter
(a =k=0.5,y ='(2 = = 1,y =—0.1,6=0.75)









(b) Evolution of S1 for T=12 and T=13
St
K1





Adding a Marriage Choice to the Model
(a=k=O.5,y1_—y2=y3= l,(40.1)
Relationship between S and Fraction of Kids out-of-wedlock for different values ofp.
ranging from 0 to 0.6 when the utility of marriage is 0.513.
(a) The relationship between out-of-wedlock births and S as
p. =0.0,0.2, 0.4 and 0.6 and the utility of marriage is 0.513.
(lower curves correspond to lower values of p.)
(b) The relationship between marriages (within-marriagebirths) and S as
p. =0.0,0.2,0.4 and 0.6 and the utility of marriage is 0.513.
(higher curves correspond to lower values of p.)FIGURE 13
Extending the Model to Include Spatial Spillovers




isolated and function as
separate "societies"; changes
in one community have no
impact on others
AFDC has an impact on
social acceptance and on
local illegitimacy rates only if
at least some members of the
community are poor. This
impact is entirely contained
within the community itself.
If no one in the community is
poor, no change in either social
approval or behavior takes
place in that community.
Partial (Spatial) Spillovers
Communities are linked to
neighboring communities,
but the effect of changes in
one community on others
diminishes with distance
=
While no one in a particular (wealthy)
community may initially change
her behavior as a result of
AFDC, changes in illegitimacy
rates in neighboring communities
alter the level of local social
acceptance. Since this effect is a
function of distance, behavior
may be affected (depending on the
degree to which the community is
geographically or otherwise isolated.)
Complete Spilovers
Communities are entirely




AFDC's impact on be-
havior changes social
acceptance equally in all
communities; If AFDC





rates are therefore likely
in all communities.
0%